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The Indo-Asia Pacific 
and the Multi-Domain 
Battle Concept
Gen. Robert B. Brown, U.S. Army, Commander of United States Army Pacific
The United States Armed Forces are at a cross-roads, facing both institutional and operational challenges. The character of war continues to 
change at a quick pace, requiring military leaders to 
reassess some of their core beliefs. This situation has led 
to the testing and refinement of concepts, capabilities, 
and people to ensure U.S. forces are ready for the con-
flicts of today and tomorrow. Without doubt, any future 
conflict will be increasingly complex and distributed, 
involving actions across multiple domains—land, air, 
sea, space, and cyber—by multiple military services, at 
times simultaneously.1 The nascent Multi-Domain Battle 
concept, some elements of which are described in a forth-
coming white paper jointly authored by the Army and 
the Marine Corps, addresses the increasing complexity 
of the battlefield and its requirement for service integra-
tion.2 While still in development and experimentation, 
the concept is already affecting operational and resource 
decisions, especially in the Indo-Asia Pacific.
This article presents three topics to illustrate how 
we are thinking about the implementation of the Multi-
Domain Battle concept in the Pacific Command area of 
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responsibility. First, it briefly discusses the strategic situa-
tion in the Indo-Asia Pacific, which typifies the need for 
a new operating concept to integrate all the United States 
Armed Forces. Next, it describes the Multi-Domain 
Battle concept, including the three elements that help 
define its desired effects: joint integration, technology, 
and people. Finally, it presents a vignette of multi-domain 
battle as it might apply at the tactical level.
The Strategic Context in the 
Indo-Asia Pacific
Given that the international state of play in this 
region is more tenuous than ever, the Multi-Domain 
Battle concept is sorely needed. The region contains 
thirty-six countries in sixteen time zones, more than 
half the world’s population, and twenty-four of the 
thirty-six megacities on Earth, and it covers more than 
half the world’s surface area.3 The region contains three 
of the world’s largest economies, seven of the largest 
militaries, and five of the United States’ seven mutu-
al defense agreement partners.4 According to Adm. 
Harry B. Harris Jr., commander of United States Pacific 
Command, “approximately $5.3 trillion in annual global 
trade relies on unimpeded access to sea lanes [such as 
those in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, 
and] $1.2 trillion of this sea-based trade destined to, or 
exported from, the United States.”5 Additionally, “the 
Strait of Malacca alone sees more than 25 percent of 
oil shipments and 50 percent of all natural gas transits 
each day.”6 In addition, the area is disaster-prone, with its 
typhoons, earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, and other 
events representing “over 60 percent of the world’s nat-
ural disasters.”7 In short, global prosperity hinges on the 
stability and security of this vast and complex region.
These demographic and economic dynamics inter-
act with the increased rate of technological change to 
add to the political and military complexity found in 
the Indo-Asia Pacific. Dramatic technological shifts 
created by unmanned capabilities, robotic learning, 
artificial intelligence, nanotech, biotech, and big data 
are only expanding military competition between geo-
political rivals. Much of these new technological tools 
depend on the use of digital connectivity—with seven 
billion devices being connected to the Internet in 2016 
and a projected fifty billion by 2020—only increasing 
the already dangerous situation in cyberspace and its 
dependence on space assets for connectivity.8
Technological shifts are also feeding and increasing 
security challenges in the Indo-Asia Pacific, with some 
the world’s most intractable problems among them. 
(Graphic by Staff Sgt. Mark A. Moore II, U.S. Army)
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Challenges include an increasingly belligerent North 
Korea that is sharing its increasingly capable missile 
technology with Iran, a growing China that is chal-
lenging international rules and norms, a revanchist 
Russia that is increasingly active in the Pacific with 
a provocative military posture, a continuing nu-
clear-backed friction between India and Pakistan, 
increasing activities by violent extremist networks 
operating in partner and ally nations, and political 
and diplomatic instability from changes in execu-
tive leadership of key regional allies and partners. 
The most dangerous threat in the Indo-Asia Pacific 
comes from regional actors with nuclear arsenals 
and the intent to undermine the international order. 
Sophisticated denial capabilities and less-than-mili-
tary forces managed by the state but backed by large 
militaries with interior lines of communication cre-
ate the danger of faits accomplis.
Like the international state of play, the military sit-
uation is also increasingly dangerous. Adversaries and 
enemies have learned from U.S. successes and failures 
over the last few decades. They recognize that U.S. 
strengths based on power projection, joint operations, 
and technological overmatch led to unprecedented 
tactical success. As such, adversaries have developed 
capabilities and concepts that attempt to remove those 
advantages, increasing the complexity of the battlefield 
for the United States Armed Forces. This has led to 
an increasingly contested global commons, with a loss 
of U.S. military dominance in the air and sea due to 
denial technologies and tactics. Whether opponents 
take gradual or sudden actions, the United States needs 
to significantly improve its strategic advantage in the 
Indo-Asia Pacific, or it will risk losing ground militarily, 
diplomatically, and economically.
Because of these strategic trends, both positive and 
negative, U.S. and partner forces need to maintain cur-
rent military advantages and recapture those that have 
been lost. Reducing the risk of conflict and ensuring the 
stability of the current international system depend on 
our ability to deter key actors from aggressive and detri-
mental actions. We must interrupt enemy decision cycles 
and present enemies with multiple dilemmas that create 
uncertainty and paralyze their efforts. If aggression leads 
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to conflict, however, we must be prepared to defeat our 
enemies unambiguously.
This approach is the driving force behind the Multi-
Domain Battle Concept, which is designed to overcome 
denial technologies and jointly affect all domains to create 
localized areas of overmatch.9 These effects will then 
re-enable maneuver for the entire joint force operating 
in any region, thereby placing an enemy in a position of 
disadvantage so U.S. forces can gain the initiative.
Elements of the Multi-Domain 
Battle Concept
The Multi-Domain Battle concept may at first sound 
like nothing more than traditional joint operations. There 
is some truth to this. What we are trying to achieve—
cross-domain effects—is not entirely new. For example, 
at Thermopylae and Salamis, the ancient Greeks em-
ployed both land and naval forces to defeat the invading 
Persians.10 Much closer to our own time, the United 
States of America owe their independence to the effective 
employment of American and French ground and naval 
forces against Lord Cornwallis’s army at Yorktown.
Another historical example is the Vicksburg 
Campaign during the American Civil War. With its 
ability to control navigation on the Mississippi River, 
Confederate Vicksburg’s artillery, infantry, and cavalry 
forces constituted a formidable anti-access and area 
denial challenge to Union forces. Union Gen. Ulysses 
S. Grant overcame that challenge only by combining 
the capabilities and effects of his own artillery, cavalry, 
and infantry forces with the naval ships led by Flag 
Officer Andrew Hull Foote.11
The introduction of the airplane, the submarine, and 
the aircraft carrier in World War I, and the incorporation 
of mobile radio communications and radar systems in 
World War II, vastly increased a strategic commander’s 
ability to operate across several domains simultaneously. 
More recently, the development of AirLand Battle in 
the 1980s and then Air-Sea Battle in 2013 show military 
thinking evolving along the same general line—how to 
win decisively, even if outnumbered or technological-
ly overmatched, by integrating operations in multiple 
domains to present enemies with multiple dilemmas. 
Different services have regularly supported each other 
in all domains. Therefore, when Harris says he wants the 
Army to provide effects outside the land domain, he is 
not asking it to do something without precedent. From 
1794 to 1950, the Army was responsible for coastal and 
harbor defense, and later for the air defense of the home-
land. The Army’s Warrant Officer Corps originated from 
the need in World War I for technical specialists to staff 
the Army’s undersea Mine Planter Service. The idea of or 
desire for cross-domain effects is not new.12
While all the services are being asked to perform their 
missions in a manner not terribly different from the past, 
there will be differences. We in the Army can no longer 
simply focus on the land, leaving the air and sea to other 
services. Nor can the Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, or 
Coast Guard simply focus on “their” domains. We must 
all better integrate our planning, operations, command 
and control, and effects across all the domains.
To achieve integration requires a new approach, 
a new mind-set. All U.S. forces must change their 
distinct service cultures to a culture of inclusion and 
openness, focusing on a 
“purple (or joint) first” 
mentality. The Army 
must further integrate a 
mission command mind-
set, where every person 
is empowered to gain the 
initiative based on his or 
her role and function. And 
it must focus on develop-
ing leaders who thrive in 
ambiguity and chaos.
Joint integration. 
The Multi-Domain Battle 
concept is expected to 
integrate three key areas: 
organizations and process-
es, technology, and people. 
Changes in organizations 
and processes will be 
designed to provide dif-
ferent and better-focused 
Army tools to joint forces 
to overcome the United 
States’ loss of superiority or 
parity in certain domains, 
particularly in the air, at 
sea, and within cyberspace. 
The Army can no longer 
focus exclusively on the 
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land domain; as part of a joint force, Army forces must 
provide other services effects in their domains to over-
come their operational challenges, and vice versa. This 
means change must focus on greater ability to have 
cross-domain effects and more seamless and effective 
integration across joint forces.
In United States Army Pacific (USARPAC), we 
are attempting this through three areas. The first is to 
design and experiment with flexible command and 
control designs, tailorable and scalable units, and flex-
ible policies in key areas. Second, most of this experi-
mentation will occur as a part of a redesigned exercise 
program designed to make all events joint and multi-
national, with the aim point being the Navy’s Rim of 
the Pacific exercise in 2018. Finally, we are supporting 
increased innovation across the services in cross-com-
ponent and combatant-command processes.
Technology. Another key area is technological 
change. We must overcome and leverage the velocity of 
technological change, rather than losing our overmatch 
capabilities through slow acquisitions programs. The 
Department of Defense and the Army have already 
created the foundation for rapid material solutions with 
the Strategic Capabilities Office at the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense and the Rapid Capabilities Office at 
Headquarters, Department of the Army. These offic-
es are doing an admirable job of repurposing current 
technology to innovate in application, a key component 
of recapturing our tactical edge. USARPAC is tied tightly 
into these efforts. It is including every piece of equipment 
in exercises and experimentation. As has been the case 
in this theater for years, USARPAC takes advantage of 
the great “battle lab” culture this command has developed 
over the past decade or more. Technology offers key tools 
to support decision making, lethality, and protection. We 
must leverage this technology to empower our men and 
women and increase their lethality and effectiveness.
People. The final area the Multi-Domain Battle 
concept addresses is people. The U.S. Armed Forces 
must use its people to overcome the challenges of being 
outnumbered, outdistanced, and “outlearned” by adver-
saries and enemies. People are America’s greatest stra-
tegic advantage. To leverage this advantage, the Armed 
Forces must develop agile and adaptive leaders through 
education and training. Rigorous iterations of decision 
making, including “impossible” scenarios or “black swans” 
that soldiers would not expect, can help develop critical 
thinking skills.13 Failure must be an option, under the 
principle that learning exercises develop leaders who 
will respond better in actual conflicts. Leaders must also 
receive some measure of cultural education and training 
that would allow them to experience different ways of 
thinking. In USARPAC, we are addressing both critical 
thinking and cultural understanding through a regional 
leader development program run by and for personnel 
at the Army service component command level. As the 
Army’s advise-and-assist brigades come online, we will 
also include unit personnel headed to the Pacific in this 
education and training pipeline to prepare them for 
operations in this region.
Multi-Domain Battle in Practice
The following fictional vignette illustrates the 
Multi-Domain Battle concept applied at the tactical 
level. This example is based on a hypothetical location 
in the Indo-Asia Pacific region.
Let us say there was an island chain or a coastal land 
mass whose location would make it decisive terrain, 
influencing aerial or maritime navigation or access to 
a strategic port. Possession of this feature by a certain 
hostile power would constitute a serious threat to the 
international order and the stability and security of the 
Indo-Asia Pacific region.
The hostile power then seized control of the fea-
ture and announced it would restrict commercial air 
and sea traffic, denying access to any nation aligned 
with the United States. Treaty obligations would 
require the United States to intervene militarily, 
though the enemy’s arsenal of weaponry and elec-
tronics was formidable.
A military option that applied the Multi-Domain 
Battle concept might include using cyber and space 
capabilities to temporarily blind and disrupt enemy 
command and control systems so special operations 
forces could move in and gain a foothold in the island 
chain. They then would facilitate Marine amphibious 
forces to secure the beachhead, an airfield, and other 
major structures required to create a secure beachhead. 
Immediately behind them would be Army watercraft 
loaded with heavy engineering equipment to repair the 
airstrip, if necessary, and construct hardened defensive 
positions. Simultaneously, Air Force C-17s and C-130s 
would bring in an Army Stryker battalion task force 
with a High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System battery, 
MULTIDOMAIN  PACOM
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specially equipped with anti-ship cruise missile pods 
and a battery of the Indirect Fire Protection Capability 
weapon system for short-range air defense. In addition, 
a battery of 155 mm howitzers with hypervelocity 
rounds would be offloaded as the Marines retrograded 
in the newly empty aircraft to reconstitute for subse-
quent forced-entry operations, if needed.
Within ninety-six hours, the Stryker battalion task 
force would be dug in and ready. With Air Force manned 
and unmanned systems, Navy ships and underwater 
drones, a suite of Army radar systems (such as AN/
TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37, or Sentinel) and the aerial threat 
detection Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense 
Elevated Netted Sensor System to see over the horizon, 
there would be an overlapping multi-domain network of 
sensors that could operate indefinitely to identify, target, 
and employ lethal and electronic fires in all the do-
mains—land, sea, air, cyber, and space—simultaneously.
The task force might be cut off from resupply or 
communication for indefinite periods. That is why this 
task force of about one thousand personnel would be 
able to support itself for up to thirty days—ten times 
the current doctrinal requirement of seventy-two hours 
for a unit of this size. But with advancements in mobile 
water purification, solar panels, batteries, wind turbines, 
and wave and tidal energy, as well as additive manufac-
turing printers to make repair parts, such a unit could 
be self-sufficient far longer than even much larger ones 
were in the previous century. They would still need fuel 
for their vehicles, but with drones and other autono-
mous platforms enhancing force protection, they could 
limit the need for fossil fuel-powered vehicles and sup-
plement organic support assets with Air Force’s Joint 
Precision Airdrop System.
Multinational forces march in formation 15 February 2017 after the 
official opening ceremony of Cobra Gold 2017 in Utapao, Thailand. 
Cobra Gold, in its thirty-sixth iteration, is the largest Theater Security 
Cooperation exercise in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. This year’s focus is to 
advance regional security and ensure effective responses to region-
al crises by bringing together a robust multinational force to address 
shared goals and security commitments in the Indo-Asia-Pacific re-
gion. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Marc Castaneda, U.S. Navy)
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To reiterate, these units might have to operate in 
extremely austere conditions with limited resources and 
without a constant ground, sea, or aerial line of commu-
nication linking them to other friendly forces. However, 
these men and women would be ready, with exceptional 
leaders exercising mission command.
Again, this is just a thought exercise based on how 
Army forces in the Pacific are thinking about and 
experimenting with multi-domain battle. Application 
of the concept may look different in other parts of 
the world, or even in different areas of the Indo-Asia 
Pacific. However, it is clear that no matter the geogra-
phy or the adversary, Army units must be well led, well 
trained, and well equipped to operate in and across 
multiple domains in support of a joint force.
One way to ensure this is the case is through ho-
listic operational testing, with Army service compo-
nent command and subordinate units working hand 
in hand with the concepts and doctrine developers 
at United States Army Training and Doctrine 
Command. Today in the Pacific, this is occurring. We 
are applying the joint integration, technology, and 
people aspects of the Multi-Domain Battle concept 
through rigorous inclusion of concepts and capabil-
ities in all our exercises, which will culminate in a 
major test at the Navy’s Rim of the Pacific exercise in 
2018. Moreover, we are considering how to integrate a 
multi-domain approach with our planning, equipping, 
and leader-development efforts.
The Army should not hesitate to resource and 
test this effort. Many of the concepts and capabilities 
found in the Multi-Domain Battle concept will be 
needed not just for future conflict but also for near-
term conflicts that might require us to be ready to 
“fight tonight.” Make no mistake: testing and imple-
menting a multi-domain approach will increase our 
readiness today, as well as prepare our men and wom-
en to win wars if the Nation requires it.
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